The Economic and Monetary Union. The Interdependence of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone

Master's Thesis from the year 2001 in the subject Economics - Monetary theory and policy, grade: 1,0, College of Europe, language: English, abstract: This paper addresses the interdependence of monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union and the ensuing consequences for the economic constitution of the eurozone. Monetary-fiscal interactions are approached from economic theory and game-theoretical perspectives, which provides the basis for a discussion of the political economy of the present institutional framework.

It draws extensively on the existing literature covering the linkages between monetary and fiscal policy as well as game-theoretical approaches to the interaction of the two major branches of macroeconomic management. The recently proliferating work on the political economy of Economic and Monetary Union is condensed into its main arguments and critically reviewed. This includes contributions to the understanding of the politics of economic policymaking as well as normative statements about the design of institutions in a monetary union. Most of the sources are papers that focus on specific issues or start from different assumptions, which implies that their conclusions are often diverging or not even compatible. While the thesis tries to provide a balanced representation of the scientific discussion in this area, it does at times stand for a clear-cut choice on controversial normative issues.

The paper consists of a theoretical and an applied part. After briefly reviewing the relevant literature in this field, the analytical section develops the necessity of fiscal coordination in a monetary union, based on the interdependence of monetary and fiscal policy as well as the strategic interaction of the institutional players involved. This insight is then applied to the present framework of macroeconomic policy in the eurozone - characterised by the fact that monetary policy is supranationally concentrated, whereas fiscal policy remains decentralised and national. The Stability and Growth Pact is discussed as an effective means of safeguarding the independence of the central bank, while falling short of the degree of fiscal coordination that would be desirable on the grounds of both stability and growth in Europe. This evaluation leads to a discussion of suggested improvements and a careful judgement of what kind of evolution would be feasible and advantageous for Economic and Monetary Union in the future.