Anglický jazyk

GERMAN REPORT SERIES

Autor: Anon

Na objednávku, dodanie 2-4 týždne

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O knihe

This pamphlet was prepared by a committee of former German officers under the supervision of the Historical Division, EUCOM. Among the contributors were former corps commanders and general staff officers at corps, army, and army group level, who had extensive experience on the Russian front during the period 1944-1945. The main author, for instance, saw action before Leningrad, near Voronezh, and later at Stalingrad. Towards the end of the war, he served successively as chief of staff of Army Groups North and Centre, during their withdrawal from Russia. In addition to discussing the tactical and logistical problems peculiar to operations of encircled forces, the authors take issue with Hitler's conviction that significant advantage can be gained by leaving isolated forces behind the advancing enemy lines. it was this notion, expressed in numerous specific orders, that made the desperate stand of encircled German troops a frequent occurrence during the Russian campaign. The problems of air support for encircled ground troops are described in a separate appendix which deals with tactical air support, air reconnaissance, supply by air, and the employment of antiaircraft units. Based on the experiences of the German Air Force in Russia and presented by a former Luftwaffe officer, the views expressed are necessarily coloured by the organisational peculiarities of the Luftwaffe and its relations to the German Army. There were a number of these publications, many of which are in publication in the German Report Series by Naval and Military Press. They are all of significant importance in understanding the way in which the war was fought, particularly on the eastern front. The Soviet-German war was marked by numerous encirclements, first of Soviet units and, as the war continued, of German units as large as entire armies, such as the 6th Army at Stalingrad. Fighting encircled became a frequent occurrence for German commanders, and their experiences at Klin, Cherkassy, and Kamenets-Podolskiy are related here as well as an analysis of the critical role of air support when fighting encircled.